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INTRODUCTION
The tragic attacks that occurred on 11 September 2001 marked the ending of an era of strategic thought for the United States Department of Defense. For half a century the United
States forged its defense establishment and its military into a large and lethal weapon capable of defeating the colossal armies of the former Soviet Union on a vast and modernized European battlefield. The policy, strategy, operational plans, tactics, and even armaments were carefully crafted over many years and tested through trial and error to produce an effective deterrent force that served as the shield of the entire free world.
This was an era of cold war, of small and limited conflicts where the world's two great superpowers vied for positional advantage and checked each others strategic moves on the global chessboard. The fall of the two towers marked the fall of this era and its strategic
solutions. Yet, while one great enemy had passed away, another more elusive foe emerged to take its place. This enemy was a far more fleeting and ubiquitous foe than the former and would require a new and unique strategy to insure its defeat. From the ashes and ruin of the two fallen towers would arise a new era and a new strategy; an era of smaller, lighter, more deployable and lethal elements of military power.
President Bush stipulated in the 17 September 2002 National Security Strategy of the
United States of America (NSS) that the nation had to transform its national security institutions to meet the emerging threats and challenges of the Twenty-First Century. In this document he specifically outlines his requirement for every branch of the armed forces to "prepare for more such deployments by developing assets such as advanced remote sensing, long range precision strike capabilities, and transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces." 2 The transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces was the charter that the Department of Defense used to launch its universal transformation of the military establishment and all of the associated services.
The Army was critical in this transformation process. The current Army was viewed much like the large, heavy, and powerful two handed broadsword of an older world; too cumbersome and unwieldy for the applications now required. If the Army was to be effective and relevant it would have to transform. The two handed broadsword would have to be exchanged for the swifter, lighter, and more precise rapier.
In the Army's vision for transformation, General Shinseki, the 34 th Army Chief of Staff, stated that the Army had to become a lighter, lethal, and more deployable force. This force must possess the ability to rapidly deploy to any portion of the globe where national interests are threatened and decisively counter those threats on terms favorable to the United States. In order to accomplish this, Shinseki directed that the Army objective was to "develop the capability to put brigade combat teams anywhere in the world within 96 hours after liftoff, a division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days." 3 The 13 These issues were basically the same as those described by the DOD and GAO reports. Although some changes and improvements were made to remedy earlier deficiencies in power projection capabilities, the majority of issues remained unsolved.
Even more concerning is that nearly a quarter century after the initial DOD surveys and a decade after Operation Desert Storm, the same issues are arising from the reports, lessons learned, and after action reports from America's most recent deployments to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The need for reliable and robust power projection capabilities at the PPPs will only increase as the Army continues to place a huge reliance on Reserve Component forces.
The recent refusals by the Secretary of Defense and the Army Chief of Staff to increase the Army's total endstrength will insure that rapid and efficient mobilization and deployment operations will remain a priority requirement and part of the Army's core competencies in the foreseeable future.
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CURRENT SITUATION
Today we continue to face many of the same challenges trying to project power as To deal with the sensitive and time critical nature of casualty information, new reporting systems and procedures must be created to make casualty reporting and tracking far more timely, accurate, and accessible to PPPs and state agencies. All involved agencies from PPPs, STARCs, and medical facilities to in-theater hospitals and staffs must be interconnected on a single automated system to allow for instant alert and access to casualty information and thus minimize the incidents of family discovery of soldier casualties without proper notification and care.
The PPPs also require a robust augmentation to the staff for media and distinguished visitors. From the very onset of the rumors of impending mobilizations and deployments, the PPPs were beset by media and visitors. Initially, the Public Affairs Offices (PAOs) were sufficiently able to handle the inquiries. However, within just a few weeks as the active force units began their deployment preparations, reserve component forces began to mobilize and arrive at the PPP/MOBSTA, and embedded media journalists arrived to join and train with their deploying units, the PPPs PAO assets rapidly became overwhelmed.
Visitors at the PPPs become constant and numerous. These visitors ranged from local In an attempt to offset the overwhelming increase of requirements on the garrison staffs, and as a result of the lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm deployments, the Army created Garrison Support Units (GSU). The GSUs are mobilized and deployed to augment or replace the garrison staffs at Army Installations during major power projection operations.
Although this concept was a great first step at meeting the requirements of PPPs, the GSUs desperately need to be restructured. They currently possess few of the support capabilities that the PPPs require to execute large scale mobilizations, major training, and to support deployment or power projection operations. GSU personnel possess few of the fundamental skill sets or certifications in unit movement, air load planning, rail operations, port operations, airfield operations, hazardous material certification, or even range certifications. 21 Additionally, few if any of the GSU personnel have any experience in running a major installation.
The GSU augmentation concept is challenged by the very dynamics of the GSU being a reserve unit. During major power projection operations, the Army must "mobilize the mobilizers!" This requires that adequate warning is given to allow the GSUs to alert, mobilize, deploy to the PPP installation, and integrate into the garrison staff. However, this is seldom the case as early deploying reserve component units are usually already deploying and at the PPP or arrive simultaneously with the GSU to the PPPs. 22 This creates a tremendous burden on the installation staff to deal with the pace and urgency of the power projection operations while concurrently training and integrating the GSU personnel. The unfortunate result of this is a reduction in efficiency at the PPP and delays, disruptions, and frustration for units that are training and deploying.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, ROLES, AND MISSIONS
The PPPs organizational structure and processes to accommodate power projection operations is also crucial to success. An examination of the validation process at the PPP mobilization stations (MOBSTA) is required to understand the tremendous effect that it has on the PPP timelines and execution of mobilizations and deployments. The mobilization validation process requires that all reserve component units undergo an intensive check of three major areas of readiness before they are "validated" for deployment. The three major areas are personnel readiness, logistic readiness, and training readiness. 23 The validation authority is the mobilization station Installation Commander.
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The personnel validation involves all aspects of personnel and administrative actions such as medical examinations and immunizations, dental screening, legal preparations, family care preparations, casualty preparations, manning strengths, and unit rostering for deployment.
Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and other past deployments highlighted the difficulties and shortages of medical, dental, and legal personnel and facilities to adequately manage the huge influx of personnel and requirements for mobilizations and deployments. 25 These same issues resurfaced during OEF and OIF deployments. PPP/MOBSTAs must possess a robust medical, dental, and legal capacity, as well as, large and modernized facilities for soldier readiness processing (SRP). The tremendous volume of personnel requiring screening and often follow on medical and dental treatment is substantial. This does not count the increased number of nondeployable soldiers that must be treated and maintained by the PPP in holding units.
The logistical validation considers all aspects of equipment and supply preparation to 
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In order for the TSBs to effectively execute their mission, they too must mobilize portions of their units as "trainers." They faced many of the same difficulties as the GSUs in attempting to conduct training and prepare units that had arrived at the PPP/MOBSTA while simultaneously mobilizing, training, and integrating TSB training battalions. This situation was another deficiency that had been discovered and discussed during ODS yet remained uncorrected. 28 The last area of training readiness that requires attention is the need for Deployment Assistance Teams. These teams are absolutely fundamental to keep pace with the constant deployment of personnel and equipment. FORSCOM originally funded the teams on a temporary basis to support the deployments for OEF. However, they later removed the funding and required installations to fund the teams internally if they desired to maintain them. The requirement for these teams and personnel will become even more significant in the future as power projection operations from PPPs increase. The Army must plan to hire and retain experts in mobilization and deployment operations at the major installations that are to serve as PPPs.
Additionally, similar teams need to be stationed at the STARC headquarters and the fifteen enhanced Separate Brigade (eSB) headquarters. These personnel should be civilians who have the sole mission to provide continuous resident expertise to plan, monitor, coordinate, and facilitate all mobilization and deployment operations in coordination with the various agencies, staffs, and commands.
FUNDING AND BUDGETS
Funding authorizations, budgets, and contracting are another major source of challenges for the PPPs. During the preparation and conduct of any mobilization and deployment activities, major decision are required almost immediately to prepare for the Herculean tasks required by the PPPs. Nearly all of these decisions are centered around funding and budgets. Significant monetary expenditures are required to begin contracts for feeding, housing, storage of personal goods and POVs, increased waste disposal, maintenance contractors, deployment supplies, deployment containers ranging from small waterproof containers and chests to 20 foot MILVANs, and other critical commodities.
The PPP and unit expenditures also dramatically increase as they begin to acquire essential equipment required for the particular area of deployment. For active forces this is very often created by both the need for unique theater specific requirements such as DCUs, vehicle marking kits, increased water carrying capacity, or other type requirements and the emphasis to conduct rapid force modernization to equip them with the latest and greatest technology. During For the RC forces, however, the situation was even more pronounced and severe.
Often their shortages were not based on unique theater requirements or force modernization but rather focused on a long standing shortage of basic or outdated equipment. RC units arriving at PPPs/MOBSTAs were short M16 rifles, M9 pistols, NBC masks, and other basic NBC equipment. They often possessed old, overused, and difficult to maintain equipment like 800 series trucks and M102 howitzers (Korean and Vietnam War vintage guns). One Medical Logistics Battalion was literally colluged together from several like battalions to form a single deployable unit with only a fraction of its equipment. It had zero of its authorized fifteen refrigeration trucks. These trucks are pacer type items for a medical logistics battalion and are used to refrigerate their vast store of medical supplies, blood, and immunizations. This unit was absolutely ineffective and unable to function without essential basic TOE equipment. 29 None of these deficiencies were the fault or result of leadership or inattention. Deficiencies for many of these types of units had been routinely reported on USRs and readiness reports. 30 A current report stipulated that in the event of a major reserve call up that 1 out of every 5 reserve soldiers would not have a weapon or an NBC mask. This equates to a total shortage of 80,000 weapons and masks. 31 These shortages and deficiencies are not unknown. They are based on a conscious decision of priority and funding to the reserves. The implications, however, on the PPPs budgeting and funding for mobilizations and deployments especially as they involve reserve component forces is dramatic. Funding issues must be addressed early on in the process and decision to utilize forces and project power. This situation is not uncommon to our military history. These same funding issues were present during Desert Storm and were cited by numerous reports. 32 The unfortunate result was that installations chose very differently how to handle the funding shortfalls. While some chose to obligate funds and take the risk of being reimbursed in the future, other installations simply chose to disapprove requisitions and refused to pay for needed equipment and supplies. This resulted in degraded units and longer deployment timelines. The same sort of issues arose during the OEF and OIF deployments. Storm and most recently OEF and OIF, it seems only reasonable to assume that future contingencies might in many cases follow these same trends. 
RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS:
As is the case with most deficiencies, the answer to these problems lies in resources.
The Installations as PPPs must have greater resourcing if they are expected to function at a level commensurate with future force projection concepts whether domestically for homeland security and disaster relief or abroad for various operations. The most obvious recommendation is to request from an already affable Congress for an Army increase of authorized endstrength and funding to sustain that without a decrement to the current modernization efforts. However, the current position appears to make that option untenable. Thus, the issue is where to obtain the resources in an era when funding is forecasted to decline and there is an ever increasing pressure to cut costs, downsize, and gain efficiencies at the cost of capability.
Some of these answers may lie in making use of a combination of internal reallocation of personnel and assets, outsourcing, realignment of reserve positions, and leveraging the possible assets made available by the upcoming Base Realignment And Closure (BRAC)
initiative.
The bottom line is that Installations that are designated as PPPs require more people and money to function effectively. Some of the problems can be fixed by reallocating TDA positions from areas of lower priority such as DECAM, ACS, and MWR to areas or high priority and core competencies such as Range Control and DOIM. This is not to say that these agencies are unimportant; but the simple fact is that military installations exist for the sole and unique purpose of training and deploying military formations. As such, they must have state of the art communications capabilities and sufficient range/training facilities. Thus, other organizations on the installations must be cut to allow for required increases in other areas.
Naturally, these decisions create great turmoil within the installation staffs because all of the agencies staunchly defend their areas of interest. Regardless, if the Army is adamant about not increasing endstrength than reallocation of TDA billets must occur to place the greatest weight of resources against the core competencies.
Outsourcing common skills and capabilities is another possible solution to offset the manning and skill mismatches on the installations. Several key areas such as the ammunition supply points (ASP), dining facilities, Education Center, Army Community Service (ACS) , and
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) functions are widely available skills that can be contracted to civilian labor. This is not a new concept but is another area that is fiercely resisted by the Installations in many areas. Again, this is not the preferred solution to an increase in budget or manpower that would allow the installations to retain current manning and add positions to the core competencies. However, it is clear that the civilian community can replace the capabilities and functions in many of these areas.
Additional remedies can be obtain ed by realigning some of the Reserve Component (RC) structure to fill the increased requirements during mobilizations and deployments. The current initiatives by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker, in realigning over 100,000 reserve component and active component spaces has promise to provide relief in many of the required skills. The GSU should be the central unit that personnel are assigned to as augmentation to the PPPs. Several positions need to be added to the GSUs' structure to provide a more robust staff and capability in G3/DPTM, G6/DOIM, G4/DOL, G1, medical, dental, PAO, Casualty Assistance, and ITO. Additionally, the GSU needs an entire company size element added as a Deployment Support Detachment (DSD). This detachment should consist of ammo specialists, fuel specialists, logistical support personnel, and range/training support personnel. The DSD's main function should be designed around replacing the Installation's deploying personnel to run ranges, provide transportation, haul ammunition, supplies, and equipment, and sustain the installation during mobilization and deployment operations. The DSD personnel would be required to maintain certifications in HAZMAT loading and control, rail load operations, air load operations, unit movement certification, ammunition management, and several of the automated computer systems that the installations use to track and manage data.
The Installations would be expected to partner with their GSUs in a habitual relationship and to provide school slots and routine training classes throughout the year for the GSU personnel to attend and gain proficiency in the required skill sets and certifications. The current GSUs possess none of these capabilities or skills. Further, the GSUs should be required to execute their Annual Training periods at their partner Installation to practice the reception and integration of the GSU personnel into the Garrison staff and to learn their roles. This would be optimal during a period when the installation actually had a major unit deploying (such as a brigade to NTC/JRTC).
Finally, the PPPs might benefit from the BRAC closures and realignments. Some portion of the TDA personnel authorizations for Installations that are closing should be migrated to the PPPs. This might allow for the necessary additions in personnel for the agencies that are the core competencies without forcing the Installations to internally reallocate and cut programs, or at least minimize the amount of cuts required. Additionally, cost savings realized by BRAC should be reinvested back into the infrastructure of the designated PPPs to insure they can accomplish their missions.
CONCLUSIONS:
The strategic importance and relevance of Army Installations and their role in the futu re of our national defense is undisputed. The ability to accomplish the missions assigned to the PPPs lies heavily in the proper resourcing of the Installations. Installation resourcing is one of the primary means required in the balance of strategic ends, ways , and means to conduct power projection operations. Several current initiatives in the Transformation of Installation Management and the Army's attempt to rebalance the AC/RC force structure mix could prove valuable in correcting some of the deficiencies discussed in this paper. However, the challenge for the Department of Defense and the Army is establishing the necessary conditions that will insure that Installations will be fully capable of supporting their increasingly critical role as Power Projection Platforms. Their vital role in the execution of the National Security Strategy through power projection both for the homeland and abroad will continue to be a critical dimension of the military element of national power. Power projection operations can be significantly enhanced by restructuring the PPPs' organization and manning, investing in the infrastructure of the PPPs, and allowing PPPs to create habitual relationships with enabling agencies and organizations.
To enhance the accomplishment of the Army mission of training and deploying formations, installations must solidify their relationships with mutually supporting agencies and units.
Additionally, they must revise their planning for mobilization and power projection operations.
This will require that they continually evolve and use historical trends and lessons to eliminate invalid planning assumptions. These measures will create synergy for Installations in power projection operations both within the United States for Homeland Security or abroad to support the national interests of the United States.
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